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Abstract
This paper studies the role of the financial sector in a↵ecting domestic resource allocation
and cross-border capital flows. I develop a quantitative, two-country, macroeconomic model in
which banks face endogenous and occasionally binding leverage constraints. Banks lend funds
to be invested in tradable or non-tradable sector capital and there is international financial
integration in the market for bank liabilities. I focus on news about economic fundamentals
as the key source of fluctuations. Specifically, in the case of positive news on the valuation of
non-traded sector capital that turn out to be incorrect at a later date, the model generates an
asymmetric, belief-driven boom-bust cycle that reproduces key features of the recent Eurozone
crisis. Bank balance sheets amplify and propagate fluctuations through three channels when
leverage constraints bind: First, amplified wealth e↵ects induce jumps in import-demand (de-
mand channel). Second, changes in the value of non-tradable sector assets alter bank lending
to tradable sector firms (intra-national spillover channel). Third, domestic and foreign house-
holds re-adjust their savings in domestic banks, and capital flows further amplify fluctuations
(international spillover channel). A common central bank’s unconventional policies of private
asset purchases and liquidity facilities in response to unfulfilled expectations are successful at
ameliorating the economic downturn.
JEL codes: E44, F32, F41, G15, G21.
Keywords: Bank Lending, Belief-Driven Dynamics, Current Account, Macroeconomic Inter-
dependence.
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 1 Introduction
This paper studies the role of the financial sector in aﬀecting domestic resource allocation and
cross-border capital flows, and in shaping dynamics such as the boom-bust cycle experienced by
several Eurozone countries between the introduction of the euro and the recent crisis.
Following the creation of Europe’s Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), large capital flows
from Eurozone core to periphery were channeled through the banking sector. Financial institutions
in Southern countries experienced an unprecedented growth in their loan portfolios (see Table 1)
which was largely backed by foreign deposits.1 A big portion of these loans was directed toward
domestic non-traded sectors—construction and services. This contributed to an asset price boom,
especially in the non-traded sectors, and led to an increase in wages and costs in a way that harmed
export competitiveness, further worsening current account positions.2 While the observed boom in
non-traded sectors was out of line with historical data, the public’s perception was that “something
fundamental was diﬀerent this time,” because of the presence of the euro.3
The “rose garden” feeling disappeared with the Global Financial Crisis (GFC). It alerted au-
thorities and public opinions in the Eurozone to the possibility of large violations of rules by other
countries, and cross-border capital flows stopped quickly. This sudden reversals in financing made
Southern Eurozone bank balance sheets weak and raised suspicions about their solvency. Bank lend-
ing, investment, and output collapsed; the spreads between lending and risk-free rates rose steeply.4
The rapid loss of investor trust in deficit nations was amplified through bank balance sheets. Loss
in bank assets led to downward pressure on bank net worth, which further weakened bank lending.
Taking Spain as the bellwether country among those that experienced the imbalances discussed
1For instance, in Spain, only about 45 percent of total deposits in Spanish financial institutions were from the
residents in 2007:QIV.
2The increase in the valuations of non-financials is well documented, and studies indicate that it started after the
European Council’s decision in 1998 in which countries were allowed to enter the final phase of EMU (Bris, Koskinen,
and Nilsson, 2009, 2012). The results are stronger for firms in construction and service industries than for those in
manufacturing. As Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010) note, the disproportionate allocation of foreign borrowing toward
non-traded sectors made the sustainability of external accounts more stringent by making it harder to match current
foreign liabilities with future surpluses.
3Economists and policymakers often conjecture that the surge in borrowing and expansion of output in these
economies resulted from the expectation of a future favorable state of the economy due to entry in the Eurozone
(Blanchard, 2006, Blanchard and Giavazzi, 2002, and Constâncio, 2005).
4International borrowing did not receive any attention in the early years of the euro. To the best of my knowledge,
Ingram (1973) was first to argue that a nation’s balance of payments would be irrelevant under a monetary union.
External balances found no place in the Maastricht criteria or in early European Commission reports. The crisis
showed that external balances matter even in a monetary union.
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 above, the amount of bank credit extended by Spanish financial institutions to non-traded sectors
more than doubled in the first decade of the euro, whereas credit to tradable sectors increased
by only approximately 20 percent (Figure 1). The rapid surge and subsequent decline of credit
to each sector is also associated with an expansion of production costs in the respective sectors.
Figures 2 and 3 illustrate the stronger fluctuations in non-traded sector variables in the boom-bust
cycle. Regarding the divergence between sectors during the boom period, Santos (2014) highlights
political motivations, arguing that the non-traded sectors were targets for politically influenced
financial institutions, as it would be possible for politicians to be reelected by riding the short-run
prosperity delivered by those sectors.5
To shed light on the link between bank lending, sectoral resource allocation, and external imbal-
ances, I develop a quantitative two-country macroeconomic model with a financial sector in which
banks lend funds to be invested in tradable or non-tradable sector capital and borrow from house-
holds in both countries. News about future valuation of assets are the key source of fluctuations I
focus on: Specifically, optimistic valuation of non-traded sector capital triggers the boom part of
the cycle, and later failure of this optimism to materialize triggers the bust. The goal is to have a
model that not only explains non-traded sector boom periods when bank balance sheets are large
but also can capture an economic downturn when expectations are unfulfilled and bank balance
sheets play a crucial role in shock transmission and propagation within and across countries.
The model merges work on incomplete market models of international business cycles, such as
Benigno and Thoenissen (2008) and Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008), and work on closed econ-
omy models with financial intermediation, as Gertler and Karadi (2011) and Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010).6 The model extends the agency problem in the latter literature and allows intermediaries to
hold a portfolio of assets from diﬀerent sectors and borrow from both domestic and foreign savers.
Bank constraints are allowed to be occasionally binding to capture the diﬀerences in bank incentives
5There are three types of credit institutions in Spain: cajas, commercial banks, and credit unions. The latter are
very tiny in size, so can be ignored. Among the other two, lending by cajas accounts for approximately 50 percent
of the total loans and deposits, and these institutions are under heavy political influence. Cajas played a key role in
the massive funding of the non-traded sector from 1997 until the eve of the crisis. In 2007:QIV, loans from cajas to
the real-estate sector constituted 61 percent of total commercial loans. See Santos (2014) for more in-depth details.
6The former literature has it roots in the influential articles of Backus, Kehoe, and Kydland (1992, 1994), Backus
and Smith (1993), Mendoza (1991), and Stockman and Tesar (1995), while the latter is a rapidly growing literature
with more recently circulated papers by Bocola (2015), Brunnermeier and Sannikov (2014), Gertler and Karadi (2013),
Gertler and Kiyotaki (2015), Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Prestipino (2016), Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto (2012), and
Mimir (2015).
2
                             4 / 60
 during boom and bust periods. The joint analysis of news shocks and the balance sheet structure of
financial intermediaries yields new insights on the transmission and propagation of belief-driven fluc-
tuations between sectors and across countries, extending results in studies by Beaudry and Portier
(2004) and others referenced below.
I use aggregate macroeconomic and banking data to calibrate the model, and I investigate the
ability of the model to match the dynamics of the Spanish economy for the 1999:QIV-2010:QI period
that includes the Spanish boom-bust cycle. Model parameters are set to match the cumulative
banking exposure to traded and non-traded sectors until 2008:QI. Simulations indicate that the
model can generate persistent current account deficits with increasing banking exposure to the non-
traded sector following positive news on the valuation of non-traded sector capital, and a sudden
reversal of capital flows and an overall collapse in aggregate output through elevated borrowing
costs of non-financials when optimistic expectations are not met.7 The model thus provides a
rigorous framework for the emerging consensus on the Eurozone crisis as the outcome of financial
intermediation, resource allocation, and a reversal of capital flows (Baldwin and Giavazzi, 2015).
The model’s success is the result of its nonlinear solution that captures the state dependent fluc-
tuations based on whether bank net worth is high or low. Three key channels of shock amplification
and transmission operates when the leverage constraints bind. First, a demand channel arises, as a
stronger financial accelerator mechanism than in one-sector models amplifies simultaneous fluctua-
tions across sectors. This contributes to a stronger wealth eﬀect in the demand for imports. Second,
bank behavior results in an intra-national spillover channel across sectors of the economy: When
perceptions about asset valuation are skewed in favor of non-traded sector assets, banks expand
their portfolios by attributing more weight to the non-traded sector; however, when perceptions
are not materialized, the decline in traded sector assets contributes more to bank balance sheet
shrinkage. This is because beliefs in higher non-traded valuation shift investment dynamics toward
non-tradable non-financials even though the returns from them are relatively smaller. When indi-
viduals realize that their beliefs were wrong, credit spreads rise by more in the traded sector due
to banking frictions, and traded sector lending becomes more expensive. Finally, a cross-border
spillover channel arises from international financial integration through bank deposits. This further
7The results are not solely dependent on this specific case of calibration. Similar results emerge when the model is
calibrated to match the cumulative increase in price-to-book ratios of the firms listed in the IBEX35 index. Robustness
checks are available in appendices.
3
                             5 / 60
 contributes to the size of bank balance sheets, and it amplifies eﬀects on the domestic real economy
through capital flows. Moreover, financial integration transmits the changes in the valuation of
bank assets to the foreign economy through the international integration of bank liabilities. These
mechanisms both increased the correction in the non-traded part of the economy and spread the
eﬀects of the crisis to traded sectors.
I also use the model to study unconventional monetary policy conducted by a common central
bank for the two countries in the model, and I show that policies reminiscent of those implemented
by the European Central Bank (ECB) help mitigate the adverse eﬀects of unmaterialized optimism
on the domestic economy. Three new ingredients characterize the study of unconventional policy
in this paper relative to previous literature. First, the use of unconventional policy is triggered by
unrealized expectations rather than rising borrowing costs, but policy ultimately aﬀects the credit
spreads that arise in response to unfulfilled news. Second, the policy design enables a response to
sector-specific variables, as in the case of ECB interventions.8 Third, the central bank intervention
in the model is funded by issuing interest bearing reserves to domestic and foreign banks, which
decreases the eﬃcacy of the policy due to frictions in banking. This way of modeling unconventional
policy is realistic for the Eurozone, as there is no central government that can issue bonds to
households in both regions. With these new ingredients, the model suggests that liquidity facilities
directed toward the financial sector are better at mitigating adverse conditions than direct asset
purchases from non-financials.
In addition to the literatures on international business cycles and closed economy macro models
with financial intermediation, this paper contributes to three other literatures. First, since the non-
traded sector in my model includes housing, the paper contributes to the literature that investigates
the relationship between house prices and current account dynamics.9 This paper diﬀerentiates
itself by modeling a financial sector that optimizes over an infinite horizon and an endogenous
balance sheet constraint in bank optimization. Furthermore, this paper uses news shocks to generate
fluctuations rather than introducing housing-biased preference shocks. Finally, the literature on
house prices and external imbalances does not study the unconventional policies analyzed in this
8ECB interventions were mostly in response to situations in the non-traded sector.
9This literature includes Coimbra (2010), Ferrero (2014), Gete (2010), and Punzi (2008). Related with this
literature, Midrigan and Philippon (2010) also study a cash-in-advance economy in which home equity borrowing is
used to conduct transactions. Independent of housing dynamics, Eggertsson and Krugman (2010) and Guerrieri and
Lorenzoni (2010) highlight the importance of tightening borrowing constraints for overall demand.
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 paper.
Second, the paper contributes to a recently growing literature that investigates the role of fi-
nancial intermediation in open economies.10 This paper mainly distinguishes itself from previous
models for three characteristics. First, the model distinguishes between diﬀerentiated goods pro-
duced in each country and assumes the existence of internationally incomplete financial markets
through the banking sector. Second, the model features a non-traded sector that is dependent on
bank funding. Third, the constraint on bank leverage binds only when bank net worth is low.
The first feature implies a role for international relative prices, which interact with accumulation of
foreign assets in internationally incomplete markets (bank deposits) in shaping the transmission of
shocks between countries through banking. The second feature allows for asset heterogeneity within
each economy. Banks hold a portfolio of assets from both sectors, and their optimization problem
leads to an additional channel for shock transmission across sectors. The third feature captures the
regime-dependent role of the funding constraints on the capital account. To my knowledge, this
paper is also the first to study central bank asset purchases and liquidity facilities during news-led
bust periods.
Third, the paper contributes to the literature on belief-driven business cycles.11 This litera-
ture faced major challenges in generating empirically plausible co-movement of aggregate variables
within the economy. In my model, the problem is overcome through the inclusion of balance-sheet
constrained banks and news about future capital quality (or valuation), instead of future produc-
tivity. Finally, the focus on non-fundamental driven fluctuations in asset values connects this paper
to the literature on bubble-generated fluctuations and the consequences of bubbles bursting.12
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. Section 3 dis-
cusses the calibration and model simulation without policy. Section 4 describes the central bank’s
unconventional policy and discusses its results. Section 5 concludes.
10Among others, see Akinci and Queralto (2014), Cacciatore, Ghironi, and Stebunovs (2014), Dedola, Karadi, and
Lombardo (2013), Kollmann, Enders, and Müller (2010), Krugman (2008), Lama and Rabanal (2015), Mendoza and
Quadrini (2010), and Nuguer (2015).
11See Arezki, Ramey, and Sheng (2015), Beaudry and Portier (2004), Christiano, Ilut, Motto, and Rostagno (2008),
Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009), Kanik and Xiao (2014), Lambertini, Mendicino, and Punzi (2013). See also Beaudry
and Portier (2014) and references therein.
12The literature on bubbles dates back to papers of Samuelson (1958), Diamond (1965), Tirole (1985), and Weil
(1987). Recent papers include Caballero and Krishnamurthy (2006), Martin and Ventura (2012, 2014), and Bengui
and Phan (2015).
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 2 The Model
I start with presenting the physical setup—a no-distortion two-country model, which allows non-
tradable inputs in the production process—, and then, I add financial frictions within and across
countries. The setup of the model assumes that the law of one price holds, and sources of PPP
deviations are home bias in preferences and the presence of non-traded goods in the economy.13
Banks are channelling funds from households (savers) to non-financial firms (borrowers), and their
ability of intermediation is limited due to a moral hazard problem which is explained in the following
sections. Banks are able to raise deposits from households in both countries, and provide funding
to domestic two non-financial sectors.
I focus on a real model, because this setting is suﬃcient to generate the importance of financial
market frictions on real activity. It is straightforward to extend the model to allow standard frictions
in the literature, such as wage rigidity, price and wage indexation, etc.
Finally, I should make clear that I do not attempt to develop a model that provides a compre-
hensive explanation of the recent events in the eurozone. My goal is not to demonstrate the changes
in public debt, nor the sovereign risk. Rather, my goal is to develop a simple international macroe-
conomic model to help understand the roles of financial frictions and beliefs on asset valuation in
credit intensive boom-bust cycles.
In what follows, I focus on Home economy and, otherwise indicated, Foreign is symmetric.
2.1 Physical Setup
The world is composed of two countries, Home and Foreign. Foreign variables are denoted with
an asterisk. Each country is populated by a unit mass of atomistic households with some fraction
supplying labor to tradable and non-tradable intermediate good production. All trade happens in
the first category of goods as there is technological constraints on moving the goods produced in
second category.14
Non-financial firms in tradable and non-tradable sectors produce output using a Cobb-Douglas
13Corsetti, Dedola, and Leduc (2008) uses all three of distribution costs, home bias in preferences and presence of
non-traded goods as sources of PPP deviations.
14To keep a parsimonious framework, I follow the strand of the literature that assumes exogenous existence of a
non-traded sector. For a model, in which the non-traded sector arises endogenously, see Ghironi and Melitz (2005).
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 production function which combines capital and labor:
Yi,t = F (Ki,t, Li,t) = e
ai,t(e i,tKi,t)
↵Li,t
1 ↵ i 2 {T,NT}, (1)
where subscript T denotes the tradable sector variables, and NT denotes non-tradable sector coun-
terparts. eai,t is the productivity shock to the production in sector i, and e i,t denotes a capital
quality shock in sector i, that both follow log-normal processes. This shock can be thought of as
capturing some form of increase in valuation or obsolescence, in good and bad times, respectively.15
There are two types of capital producers, each of them producing capital for a respective sector.
The law of motion of capital for each capital producer is subject to convex adjustment costs, and
in the aggregate it follows the process:
Ki,t+1 = (1   )e i,tKi,t + Ii,t   f( Ii,t
e i,tKi,t
)e i,tKi,t i 2 {T,NT}, (2)
where f(•) denotes the convex adjustment costs.
Non-financial goods producers obtain capital for the use in next period by issuing claims Si,t,
at the price of the capital, Qi,t. By the assumption of no-arbitrage, value of claims issued should
be equal to the value of capital bought by non-financials:
Qi,tKi,t+1 = Qi,tSi,t i 2 {T,NT}. (3)
The representative household consists of a family, in which workers in the family are divided
into two, each group supplying labor to firms for tradable or non-tradable goods production. The
whole family jointly maximize an inter-temporal utility function that derives utility from household’s
consumption of basket of goods, Ct, and disutility from supplying labor to tradable and non-tradable
good production, LT,t and LNT,t, respectively:
U(Ct, LT,t, LNT,t) =
C1 ⇢t
1  ⇢  $
 
L1+'1T,t
1 + '1
+
L1+'2NT,t
1 + '2
!
. (4)
15Appendices of Gertler, Kiyotaki and Queralto (2012) provide micro foundations for the capital quality shock. As
in Merton (1973), the capital quality shock provides fluctuations in the value of capital and therefore, endogenous
fluctuations in relative prices.
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 Within this setting, relative hours spent respond less to sectoral wage diﬀerentials due to sector
specificity.
Households enjoy consumption of an Armington aggregate of composite tradable and non-traded
goods. The final consumption aggregate is given by,
Ct =
h
a1/T C
( 1)/
T,t + (1  aT )1/C( 1)/NT,t
i/( 1)
, (5)
where CT,t is the consumption of the composite traded good, and CNT,t is the consumption of
non-traded good. The parameter aT denotes the share of tradables in final consumption, and  is
the inverse intratemporal elasticity of substitution between tradable and non-tradable goods.
The composite tradable good is also an Armington aggregate of Home and Foreign produced
traded goods:
CT,t =
h
a1/!H C
(! 1)/!
H,t + (1  aH)1/!C(! 1)/!F,t
i!/(! 1)
, (6)
where CH,t is the consumption of the traded good produced in Home, and CF,t is the consumption
of the traded good produced in Foreign. The parameter ! is the inverse intratemporal elasticity of
substitution between Home and Foreign goods, and there is home-bias in consumption if aH > 12 .
16
Market clearing in each sector requires that Home production equals Home and Foreign con-
sumption, and investment:
YT,t = CH,t + C
⇤
H,t + IT,t and YNT,t = CNT,t + INT,t. (7)
If there were no financial frictions within and across countries, the competitive equilibrium would
be the allocations of a social planner’s solution that would be the result of choosing aggregate quanti-
ties (CH,t, CF,t, C⇤F,t, C⇤H,t, CNT,t, C⇤NT,t, LT,t, LNT,t, L⇤T,t, L⇤NT,t, IT,t, INT,t, I⇤T,t, I⇤NT,t, ST,t,SNT,t, S⇤T,t,
S⇤NT,t) as a function of the aggregate state (IT,t 1, INT,t 1, I⇤T,t 1, I⇤NT,t 1, e T,t , e NT,t , e
 ⇤T,t , e 
⇤
NT,t ,
KT,t,KNT,t, K⇤T,t,K
⇤
NT,t, e
aH,t , eaNT,t , ea
⇤
F,t , ea
⇤
NT,t) to maximize the expected convex combination of
Home and Foreign households’ discounted utility subject to resource constraints and laws of motion
16A well known result in the literature from the work of Cole and Obstfeld (1991) is that when households have
Cobb-Douglas preferences over Home and Foreign good consumption, and have log-utility, then international markets
are complete even under financial autarky. In addition to introducing a non-traded production sector, here I deviate
from this case by the assumption of non-logarithmic preferences, and setting a non-unitary elasticity of substitution
between Home and Foreign good consumption.
8
                            10 / 60
 of capital in each sector.
This frictionless economy is the bare-bone model. In what follows, I focus on the decentralized
economy, and introduce financial frictions that will impede flow of funds within and across countries.
2.2 Households
When there is a financial sector, the representative household in each country consists of a
fraction of g bankers, and 1 g workers. Bankers manage financial intermediaries and transfer their
earnings back to the household, and workers similarly return their income back to the household.
Households do not provide funds to non-financial firms nor do they acquire capital. They deposit
funds to financial intermediaries that they are not related with. This assumption generates perfect
consumption insurance within the household. Banks raise funds from households only by oﬀering
non-contingent risk-less short term debt (deposits).
Households maximize expected inter-temporal utility from consumption, Ct, net of disutility
from providing labor to traded and non-traded sectors, LT,t and LNT,t, as given by
E0
1X
t=0
 tU(Ct, LT,t, LNT,t) (8)
where U(•) is given by (4).
Households in each country hold one-period deposits supplied by domestic and foreign banks.
I assume that deposits pay risk-free consumption-based real returns. Households enter period t
with deposits of Home and Foreign banks, Bt and ⇠tB⇤,t, in units of home consumption, where ⇠t
represents the real exchange rate.17 They receive gross income on deposits and labor income, and
allocate these resources between consumption and purchases of deposits to be carried next period.
The period budget constraint in units of consumption is
Ct +Bt+1 + ⇠tB⇤,t+1 + ⌘2⇠t(B⇤,t+1)
2
= (1 + rt)Bt + ⇠t(1 + r⇤t )B⇤,t + wT,tLT,t + wNT,tLNT,t +⇧T,t +⇧NT,t +⇧B,t + T
f⇤
t + Tt,
(9)
where ⌘2⇠t(B⇤,t+1)
2 is the cost of adjusting holdings of Foreign deposits, T f⇤t is the fee rebate, taken
as given by the household, and equal to ⌘2⇠t(B⇤,t+1)
2 in the equilibrium, and Tt is the lump-sum
17Similarly, Foreign households hold deposits at Foreign and Home banks, which are denoted as B⇤⇤,t and
B⇤t
⇠t
, in
terms of Foreign consumption units.
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 transfers. For simplicity, I assume that the scale parameter ⌘ is identical across costs of adjusting
Home and Foreign deposits. The representative Foreign household faces a similar constraint in units
of foreign consumption. Introducing convex adjustment costs ensures that zero foreign deposit
holding is the unique steady state, and hence economies go back to their initial position after
temporary fluctuations. ⇧T,t, ⇧NT,t, and ⇧B,t represent the profits back to household by traded
and non-traded sector workers, and bankers, respectively.
Home household maximizes (8) subject to (9). The Euler equations for deposit holdings at
Foreign and Home banks are
C ⇢t [1 + ⌘B⇤,t+1] =  (1 + r
⇤
t+1)Et

⇠t+1
⇠t
C ⇢t+1
 
, (10)
C ⇢t =  (1 + rt+1)Et
h
C ⇢t+1
i
. (11)
I omit the transversality conditions for deposit holdings. With ⌘ > 0, no-arbitrage condition implies:
1 + rt+1
1 + r⇤t+1
=
Et[ ⇠t+1⇠t C
 ⇢
t+1]
(1 + ⌘B⇤,t+1)Et[C ⇢t+1]
.
Consumption-labor trade-oﬀs are given by:
wT,t =
$L'1T,t
C ⇢t
, wNT,t =
$L'2NT,t
C ⇢t
. (12)
These equations ensure that the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure
is equal to the respective wage rate in each sector.
Given (5) and (6), one can also derive the standard demand curves for traded Home good as
follows:
CH,t = aH
✓
RPH,t
RPT,t
◆ !
CT,t and C
⇤
H,t = (1  aH)
 
RPH,t
⇠tRP ⇤T,t
! !
C⇤T,t, (13)
where RPH , RPT and RP ⇤T denote the relative prices of Home traded goods, composite traded goods,
and Foreign composite traded goods. The conditions for the Foreign traded goods are analogous.
Similarly, the generic demand curve for Home non-traded and composite traded goods are given
10
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 by:
CNT,t = (1  aT ) (RPNT,t) Ct and CT,t = aT (RPT,t) Ct. (14)
2.3 Firms
There are two types of producers in each sector, namely goods producers and capital producers.
2.3.1 Goods Producers
Goods are produced under perfect competition in both sectors. The production technology at
time t is given as a constant returns to scale function, F (KT,t, LT,t) for tradable good producers,
and F (KNT,t, LNT,t) for non-tradable good producers as in (1).
Firms finance their capital expenditures in each period by issuing equities, and selling them
to financial intermediaries. Firms issue Si,t amount of state-contingent claims to raise funding for
buying capital that will be used in the next period, Ki,t+1. At the beginning of the period t + 1,
firms obtain revenues and make payments to shareholders. Using Euler’s formula, the gross profits
per unit of eﬀective capital in each sector can be written as:
Zi,t ⌘ RPii,tYi,t   wi,tLi,t
Ki,t
= RPii,tFKi,t(Ki,t, Li,t). (15)
where i 2 {T,NT} and ii 2 {H,NT}.
Banks can perfectly monitor and evaluate the non-financial firms, and hence, every financial
contract between the non-financials and banks delivers its promises. Goods producing firms obtain
zero profits state-by-state, and the return on capital is fully paid out to the financial intermediary.
The period t payoﬀ of capital in tradable and non-tradable sectors are:
 Et [⇤t,t+1 (1 + ri,k,t+1)] =  Et

⇤t,t+1
✓
Zi,t+1 + (1   )e i,t+1Qi,t+1
Qi,t
◆ 
. (16)
where ⇤t,t+1 = UC(t+1)UC(t) .
The interest paid out to the bank on the loan varies with the marginal product of capital and
with the fluctuations in prices. In each sector, firms also choose labor demand as follows:
wi,t = RPii,tFLi(Ki,t, Li,t). (17)
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 Labor demand conditions state that the marginal product of labor in each sector should be equal
to the respective wage rate.
2.3.2 Capital Producers
Capital producers produce new capital that will be used by goods producers in the subsequent
period. They decide for investment after buying the used capital from goods producers. The price
of capital is equal to the marginal cost of investment goods production:
Qi,t =
1
1  fI( Ii,t
e i,tKi,t
)e i,tKi,t
. (18)
Capital adjustment costs cause prices to deviate from unity and contribute to the financial
accelerator mechanism that will be discussed below.
It is important to note that every period, there is a net profit transfer from capital producers
and banks to the household that they are a member of. Profit transfers will aﬀect the household’s
budget constraint at the equilibrium, and therefore they are important in determination of the law
of motion of net foreign assets.18
2.4 Financial intermediaries
Financial intermediaries obtain funds from both Home and Foreign households, and lend to
domestic firms operating in traded and non-traded sectors. In doing so, they engage in maturity
transformation as they hold long term risky assets of firms, and fund these assets by short term lia-
bilities. Moreover, intermediaries can raise funds through their own net worth, which is accumulated
through their earnings.
The value of loans extended to each sector is equal to the price, Qi,t, times the amount of state-
contingent claims of bank j, Si,t(j). The total value of loans supplied to both sectors should be
equal to the bank net worth and total amount of deposits raised from Home and Foreign households.
18Namely, the equilibrium budget constraint of the home household will be Ct + Bt+1 + ⇠tB⇤,t+1 = (1 + rt)Bt +
⇠t(1 + r
⇤
t )B⇤,t + wT,tLT,t + wNT,tLNT,t + ⇧T,t + ⇧NT,t + ⇧B,t, and net profits from financial intermediaries and
capital producers will be included in ⇧ terms. Foreign household has a similar condition, and the diﬀerence between
aggregate Home budget constraint and Foreign budget constraint will give the net foreign asset position of the
economy. A detailed derivation is available in Appendix B.
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 Hence, the intermediary balance sheet takes the following form:
QT,tST,t(j) +QNT,tSNT,t(j)| {z }
Assets
= Bt+1(j) +B
⇤
t+1(j)| {z }
Liabilities
+ Nt(j)| {z }
Bank Capital
(19)
The earnings of an individual Home bank j in period t is the payoﬀ from total assets funded in
the previous period net of cost of deposits raised from Home and Foreign:
Nt(j) = (1+rk,T,t)QT,t 1ST,t 1(j)+(1+rk,NT,t)QNT,t 1SNT,t 1(j) (1+rt) (Bt(j) +B⇤t (j)) (20)
To rule out the possibility of bankers’ accumulating enough wealth to end their need to raise
funding from households, bankers are assumed to be finitely lived. Each period, with probability
1  , bankers switch occupations. Thus, the average time that a household member being a banker
is given by 11   . Exiting bankers bring their end-of-period net worth back to their household, and
entering bankers receive funding right before they start business. Thus, every period (1    )g
bankers exit and enter, and the number of workers and bankers is kept unchanged. Accordingly,
the bankers’ objective is to maximize their terminal net worth before they exit:
Vt = Et
" 1X
s=1
(1   ) s 1 ⇤t,t+sNt+s(j)
#
.
Following Gertler and Karadi (2011), Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), and as earlier in Holmström
and Tirole (1997), there exists an agency problem between banks and households. After collecting
deposits, banks can divert funds to the household that they are a member of. In this case, households
can force the bank into bankruptcy and recover a fraction of the assets that the intermediary is
holding. The fraction that can be divertable by banks depends on the types of assets that they hold.
In particular, I assume that it is harder to divert non-tradable sector assets than diverting tradable
sector assets. By doing so, I attempt to capture that non-tradable sector assets are easier to monitor
by households because most of these securities represent immobile resources.19 Let Vt(Nt(j)) be the
maximized value of Vt, given banks’ period retained earnings.20 The following incentive constraint
19For instance, it would be harder to run away with houses than with automobiles.
20Under frictionless banking, the timing of the retained earnings would be irrelevant for a banker. In the existence
of financial frictions, it is optimal for a banker to accumulate net worth until they exit and become workers.
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 will suﬃce to prevent bankers to run away with their assets:
Vt(Nt(j))    TQT,tST,t(j) +  NTQNT,tSNT,t(j), (21)
with  NT <  T .
The above condition indicates that households finance bank j through holding its deposits, as
long as the continuation value of the bank is at least equal to the total gain of the bank by diverting
its assets.
At the end of period t  1, the intermediary’s program becomes
Vt 1(Nt 1(j)) = Et 1
h
 ⇤t 1,t
n
(1   )Nt(j) +  
⇣
maxST,t,SNT,t
⇣
maxBt+1,B⇤t+1Vt(Nt(j))
⌘⌘oi
(22)
subject to (19), (20), and (21).
I guess and verify that the banks’ value function is linear in their net worth, i.e. Vt(Nt(j)) =
⌫tNt(j). First order necessary conditions for the banker’s problem yield
 Et [⇤t,t+1⌦t+1(rk,T,t+1   rt+1)] = µt T , (23)
 Et [⇤t,t+1⌦t+1(rk,NT,t+1   rt+1)] = µt NT , (24)
with
µt = max
⇢
1 
✓
 Et [⇤t,t+1⌦t+1(1 + rt+1)]Nt
 TQT,tST,t +  NTQNT,tSNT,t
◆
, 0
 
. (25)
In the above conditions, µt is the Lagrangian multiplier associated with the banker’s program;
⌦t is the shadow value of a unit of net worth to the banker at time t, which is given by ⌦t ⌘
(1    +  ⌫t), averaging the exiting and continuation states; and ⌫t is the marginal value of net
worth.21
When bankers’ incentive constraint binds, their discount factor,  ⇤˜t,t+1 ⌘  ⇤t,t+1⌦t+1, diﬀer-
entiates from household discount factor,  ⇤t,t+1. However, when bankers’ incentive constraint does
not bind, µt = 0, and they acquire deposits until the discounted cost of deposits is equal to the
gain from lending to non-financial firms. In that case, banks’ value function is equal to their net
21A detailed solution of the banker’s problem can be found in Appendix A.
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 worth (i.e. ⌫t = 1), indicating an equivalence of the stochastic discount factors of agents in the
economy. If the incentive constraint does not bind, financial frictions within countries evaporate,
and the diﬀerence between non-tradable sector and tradable sector firm financing vanishes.
When µt > 0, the spreads between the gains from lending to non-financial firms and the cost
of borrowing from households are non-zero in equilibrium, and they are scaled by the divertable
proportion of assets in each sector. The magnitudes of spreads depend on both how tight the
incentive constraint is binding for the banker and on the types of assets in the bank balance sheet.
As it is harder to divert non-tradable producers’ assets than tradable sector’s assets, the impact
of the moral hazard friction on the interest rate spread in non-traded sector is weaker. It is also
useful to note that, heterogeneity in the divertability of assets in bank balance sheet prevents the
indeterminacy problem of bank portfolio allocation when balance sheet constraint binds.22
The linearity of the value function helps us to write the incentive constraint in the following
form:
QT,tST,t(j) +
 NT
 T
QNT,tSNT,t(j)
Nt(j)
 ⌫t
 T
. (26)
When bank net worth is low, limits to arbitrage on bank portfolio leads to a maximum ratio of
assets to net worth that satisfies the incentive constraint. In this case, the total amount of lending
to non-financial firms is limited by the intermediary’s net worth. The gain from running away with
the assets is balanced with the cost of default of the intermediary. The ease of divertibilty also
depends on the asset class and captured by the  NT T term in the above condition.
On the other hand, when bank net worth is high enough, incentive constraint does not bind,
and banks are not constrained by their balance sheet when extending loans to non-financial sector.
Solution to the bankers’ problem reads as marginal value of an additional bank net worth can
be written in the following form:
⌫t =
 Et [⇤t,t+1⌦t+1(1 + rt+1)]
1  µt . (27)
It is important to note that the value from additional unit of net worth varies counter-cyclically.
In the case of an economic downturn, banks’ incentive constraint binds, sectoral spreads increase,
22Devereux and Sutherland (2011) introduce a higher-order solution method for stochastic, general equilibrium
models with portfolio choice that deals with this problem.
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 and an additional unit of bank net worth becomes more valuable. Conversely, during the boom
periods, banks’ incentive constraint does not bind, and the continuation value is lower than the
previous case.
2.4.1 Aggregation
The solution in Appendix A implies that leverage does not depend on bank specific factors, and
the equation (25) can be aggregated to get a relationship between the aggregate bank demand on
non-financial firm assets and aggregate bank net worth:
QT,tST,t +
 NT
 T
QNT,tSNT,t
Nt
 ⌫t
 T
. (28)
Total banking net worth is the sum of existing and entering bankers’ net worth:
Nt = Nx,t +Nn,t, (29)
where Nx,t indicates existing banker net worth, and Nn,t is entering banker net worth. Existing
bankers carry out the earnings from the assets they held in previous period net of the cost of
deposits, with a continuation probability of  :
Nx,t =  
h
(ZT,t + (1   )QT,t) e T,tST,t 1 + (ZNT,t + (1   )QNT,t) e NT,tSNT,t 1   (1 + rt) (Bt +B⇤t )
i
.
(30)
Entering bankers receive start-up funds from the household that they are a member of. These
start-up funds are a fraction of the assets that the exiting bankers bring back to the household.
Without loss of generality, let "1   of exiting bankers’ assets are transferred to entering bankers
within the same household, and then new banker net worth becomes:
Nn,t = "
h
(ZT,t + (1   )QT,t) e T,tST,t 1 + (ZNT,t + (1   )QNT,t) e NT,tSNT,t 1
i
. (31)
Now, equation (29) can be rewritten as:
Nt = (  + ")
⇥
(ZT,t + (1   )QT,t) e T,tST,t 1 + (ZNT,t + (1   )QNT,t) e NT,tSNT,t 1
⇤
   (1 + rt) (Bt +B⇤t ) .
(32)
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 Equation (32) tells that the ex-post returns on non-financial firm assets are the main sources of
fluctuations in net worth (see also equation (16)). Moreover, in any sector, a change in the valuation
of capital aﬀects both the bank net worth directly through itself, and indirectly through its impact
on the other sector’s returns. The latter is at work through equations (23) and (24), causing a
stronger accelerator mechanism than in standard models. Furthermore, (23) and (24) also transmit
the changes in valuations across sectors.
2.5 Equilibrium
Market clearing conditions in securities, deposits, goods and labor markets are required to close
the model. The equilibrium in goods market in both sectors in Home is given by (7). A similar
condition also holds in Foreign.
Market clearing for securities imply that the total supply of firm securities should be equal to
the total amount of capital bought within respective sectors, as given in (3).
The equilibrium deposit market condition requires that total demand on deposits by Home and
Foreign households should be equal to the aggregate bank assets net of bank net worth:
Bt+1 +B
⇤
t+1 = QT,tST,t +QNT,tSNT,t  Nt. (33)
And, labor demand equals sectoral labor supply, implying:
RPii,t(1  ↵)eai,t(e i,tKi,t)↵Li,t ↵ = $
L'i,t
C ⇢t
. (34)
Similar conditions hold also in Foreign.
Finally, under international incomplete markets, equilibrium allocation depends on the net for-
eign asset position at the beginning of each period. A detailed derivation of the net foreign asset
position is given in Appendix B.
The equations (1, 2, 3, 7, 10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 23, 24, 25, 27, 32, 33) together
with respective price equations, and their Foreign counterparts, in which (1, 2, 3, 15, 16 ,17, 18)
have analogous components in traded and non-traded sectors, together with the net foreign asset
condition determine the endogenous variables (YT,t, YNT,t, KT,t+1, KNT,t+1, ST,t, SNT,t, Ct, CT,t,
CH,t, CF,t, CNT,t, IT,t, INT,t, LT,t, LNT,t, ZT,t, ZNT,t, rt+1,rk,T,t, rk,NT,t, QT,t, QNT,t, RPT,t, RPNT,t,
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 RPH,t, RPF,t, wT,t, wNT,t, ⇠t, ⌫t, µt, Nt, Bt+1, B⇤,t+1) and their Foreign counterparts as a function
of the state variables (IT,t 1, INT,t 1, KT,t, KNT,t, (1+rt)Bt, (1+rt)B⇤,t, eaH,t , eaNT,t , e T,t , e NT,t)
and their Foreign counterparts, together with the exogenous shock processes. Summary of the
equilibrium conditions are available in Table 2.
3 Model Calibration and Simulations
In this section, I illustrate the model dynamics and highlight the role of financial frictions in
explaining the imbalances.
3.1 Calibration
To begin with the conventional parameters, I set the depreciation rate,  , the capital share, ↵,
households’ discount factor,  , to their standard values in the literature. I set them to 0.025, 0.333,
and 0.995, respectively. As regards to the convex adjustment costs of foreign deposit holdings
to the household, ⌘, I use 0.025 as in Ghironi and Melitz (2005). This value implies that the
cost of adjusting deposits has a very small impact on model dynamics, other than pinning down
the deterministic steady state and ensuring mean reversion in the long run when fluctuations are
transitory. Moreover, in line with the standard RBC literature, I set the inverse of the inter-temporal
elasticity of substitution from consumption, ⇢, to 2, and the inverse of the Frisch elasticities in traded
and non-traded sectors, '1 to 0.276, and '2 to 0.276. These imply a Frisch elasticity of 10 in each
sector, which is higher than in the conventional literature, which is typically between 1 and 3 for
the whole economy. However, as stated by Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010), the calibration in the paper
compensates for the absence of several features in quantitative macro models, including nominal
price and wage rigidities. I also follow Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010) when setting the relative weight
of labor in the utility, and set $ to 5.584. The functional form of the capital adjustment costs
is given by '
K
2
✓
Ii,t
e i,tKi,t
   
◆2
for every i 2 {T,NT}. I use the value in Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999), and set 'K to 5.
For the parameters that are of importance for the international dynamics, I again use the
conventional values in the literature. I take the elasticity of substitution between Home and Foreign
produced traded goods, !, to 1.2, and I follow Drozd and Nosal (2010) to set the elasticity of
substitution between traded and non-traded goods in the assembly of final consumption good, , to
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 1. As my scope of interest is to build a model that matches the Eurozone dynamics, I set the share
of home-produced intermediate inputs in the tradable intermediate input, aH , to 0.55, and share of
tradables in the final consumption, aT to 0.55, which are both in line with the data.
Which is not standard in the literature is the calibration of this model’s financial sector variables.
The fractions of divertable capital in each sector,  T ,  NT ,  ⇤T , and  ⇤NT , are sector specific, and
they capture the heterogeneity between the traded and non-traded sector assets of the financial
intermediaries. Moreover, my choices of the proportional transfers to entering bankers, ", and the
survival probability of bankers,  , are meant to be suggestive. I pick these parameters to hit the
following targets: a home steady state interest rate spread in the tradable sector of 100 bps, a
steady state interest rate spread in the non-tradable sector of 50 bps, and a steady state leverage
ratios of 4 and 6 for Home and Foreign.23 Leverage ratios are in the range of used values in
the literature and I set a smaller steady state leverage ratio for Home because McKinsey Global
Institute (2010) documents smaller leverage ratios for Spanish institutions vis-à-vis German credit
institutions. Finally, I also set an average horizon of 10 years for bankers, fixing  , to 0.975, and I
set " to 0.0001, to minimize the eﬀects of bank entry from model dynamics.
Table 4 summarizes the parametrization of the model.
3.2 Sensitivity of Leverage Ratios
Before the discussion of belief-driven business cycles, it will be useful to see how the steady-state
bank leverage behaves when bank net worth is suﬃciently small (when balance sheet constraints
bind). Figure 5A shows the results when holding the proportion of divertable assets constant at
their calibrated values while varying credit spreads. Similarly, Figure 5B shows the results holding
credit spreads constant at their calibrated values, but moral hazard parameters varying around their
steady-state values. Figure 5A shows that an increase in credit spreads will lead to an increase in
bank leverage holding everything else constant. As staying in the financial sector becomes more
profitable, banks will expand their asset portfolios and become more leveraged. Figure 5B shows
that if the proportion of divertability of assets increases, banks shrink their asset portfolios. The
reason is that under high divertability, households will be less willing to hold bank deposits, because
23I choose a smaller interest rate spread in the non-tradable sector, because those assets were seen as highly liquid
in the pre-crisis period. The model dynamics are also not solely dependent on the choice of these parameters. The
qualitative features of the results are the same even if one sets the gap between tradable and non-tradable sector
spreads to a smaller or a larger value. Robustness checks are available upon request.
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 of the high proportion of losses in the case of bank default. In this case banks cannot extend more
credit even if they would like to do so, because they do not have suﬃcient funds.
3.3 Belief-Driven Dynamics
To identify the channels of shock propagation, I build up the final model through three lay-
ers. The first layer is a standard two-country model with non-tradable goods in the production
process, in which there is no international financial asset trade. This layer is able to demonstrate
some principles of belief-driven fluctuations when international financial markets are incomplete,
such as low international consumption correlations, and the wealth eﬀect driven changes in import
demand.24 Then, I introduce financial intermediaries in the second layer, but still keep the interna-
tional financial markets under autarky. Having this second layer helps one to separate the domestic
amplification and sectoral propagation mechanisms of balance sheet constrained banks from the in-
ternational bank spillover channel. Finally, in the last layer, integration of deposit markets further
aﬀects banks’ acquisition of funds for their activities, and the external account signals the elevated
macroeconomic and financial stresses.
In what follows, I will first discuss the performance of the model with respect to its abilities
of capturing Spanish data, and then I will identify the underlying channels at work by comparing
dynamics in each layer of the model.
3.3.1 Specification
The shock specification assumes an anticipated (uAi,t n) and an unanticipated component (uUi,t)
as follows:
 i,t = ⇢  i,t 1 + "i,t
"i,t = uAi,t n + uUi,t
where "i,t represents a white noise error in forecasting  i,t that is based on its own past. uAi,t n
constitutes a news shock about  i,t which is revealed n periods beforehand, and uUi,t is the unantic-
ipated component of the white noise, "i,t, which represents the last piece of information received by
agents about "i,t. Sector specificity is again captured by the subscript i 2 {T,NT}. uUi,t and uAi,t are
24In models with non-traded good production sector, even under a planner’s solution, relative prices do not force
equality between the marginal rates of substitution for non-tradable goods across countries, since the forward contracts
for non-tradables are traded domestically. Hence, even under no restrictions of international asset trade, the existence
of a non-traded sector implies lower international consumption correlations. For further discussion, see Obstfeld and
Rogoﬀ (1996, Chapter 5).
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 mean-zero white noise terms that are not correlated over time and not correlated with each other. If
uUi,t =  uAi,t n at t = n, then anticipations are not realized. In line with my motivation of the recent
boom-bust period in Southern Eurozone, I set the number of anticipation periods to 33, indicating
the number of quarters between 1999:QIV and 2008:QI. In period 33, uUi,t hits as a counteracting
shock that leads to a disappointment with unfulfillment of expected favorable conditions. Hence,
the boom-bust period is pure belief-driven and not based on fundamentals.
3.3.2 Model Performance
I investigate the ability of the model to match the Spanish data. I adjust the expected valuation
in assets to match the cumulative banking exposure to traded and non-traded sectors until 2008:QI.
The adjustment implies 25 percent and 14.5 percent expected valuations in non-traded and traded
sector assets, respectively.25,26,27 Figures 6 and 7 compare model dynamics generated under these
expectations with the data.
Figure 6A plots Spain’s current account-to-GDP ratio over the period 1999:IV to 2010:I versus
the value implied by the model experiment, while Figure 6B does the same for the financial sector
credit extended to tradable and non-tradable sectors. In the former, I normalize the steady-state
current account-to-GDP ratio to the 1995-2014 average. In the latter, dynamics show the increase
in levels starting from the year 2000. The anticipation of an increase in the value of capital drives
country borrowing and simultaneously generates an expansion in the credit extended to non-traded
sectors. The model reasonably captures the pattern of the current account balance and the diver-
gence in bank credit to the traded and non-traded sectors during the boom period. After 2008:QI,
bank credit in the data declines slower than in the model, reflecting the interventions by the ECB
and other policy issues going on in the Spanish economy.28 Although the underlying factors for
25Shock persistence is set to 0.999 since accession to the Eurozone was seen as an irreversible event.
26I also conduct experiments under which I match the cumulative changes in each sector’s Tobin’s Q. For a Tobin’s
Q proxy, I use price-to-book ratios of the construction and manufacturing firms listed in IBEX35 index. The model
is again able to capture key features of data, although the divergence in lending between sectors is less pronounced.
Figures 22 and 23 in appendices exhibit this comparison. However, calibration with using data for firms listed in
IBEX35 should be considered as a conservative one, because the eﬀects of the crisis were more severe for small-to-
medium enterprises (SMEs).
27The experiments with skewed expectations toward the valuation of non-traded-sector assets can be justified by
several arguments. One possible motivation is by Santos (2014): The non-traded sector in Spain was a target for
politicians due to its ability to deliver short-run prosperity that would help oﬃcials to get reelected. These incentives
of politicians were known by the public, and this knowledge yielded a belief of higher valuation in non-traded sectors
in the future, especially in the housing sector. Another motivation can be the power of manipulation and deception
toward the non-traded sector assets (Akerlof and Shiller, 2015).
28When I introduce policy into the model in the next section, the model does a better a job in capturing the
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 the boom and the bust are diﬀerent in this model (i.e. optimism and disappointment), the model
would again capture an asymmetry if the factors driving the boom and the bust were the same, due
to the presence of occasionally binding constraints of banks.29 It is observed that fluctuations are
more pronounced when bank constraints bind, highlighting the amplification role of banking in bad
times.
Figures 7A and 7B compare the shares of traded and non-traded sectors in overall gross value
added versus the model counterparts.30 The model is, again, doing well in capturing the relative
growth in the non-traded sector although it exaggerates its expansion between 2007 and 2008. A
collapse in non-traded sector funding after the unfullfilment of expectations shrinks the non-traded
portion of the economy faster and overall distribution of sectors in the whole economy becomes
balanced.
3.3.3 Three Model Versions
As discussed in the previous subsection, the model captures the key features of bank lending,
sectoral resource allocation, and external borrowing of the Spanish boom-bust cycle. To understand
the contribution of key ingredients in the model in its success, I compare three model versions.
First, I shut down the banking and international asset markets (Version I). Then, I add financial
intermediaries but keep the international financial markets under autarky (Version II). Finally, I
allow for international financial integration through liabilities, and compare model dynamics for
each version (Baseline model).
Figure 8 compares Version I with Version II. The red line represents the dynamics from Version
I, and the blue line indicates dynamics from Version II. It is observed that the diﬀerence between
these two versions is small when the leverage constraints are not binding in the model with banking.
Expectations of future favorable conditions lead to an increase in investment in both sectors (with
an increase in banking lending under Version II). Higher investment turns into a higher production
in each sector. Expansion of the economy puts downward pressure on domestic prices, and the
balanced-trade together with an appreciation in real exchange rate imply higher exports. As there
is no international asset trade in these versions, current account is always zero. There is no role for
post-crisis period.
29Figure 21 in appendices exhibits asymmetric responses under the same but opposite sign fundamental transitory
shocks.
30Due to the discrepancies in the data, total gross value added do not add up to 200.
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 the interest rate spreads in Version I due to absence of banking frictions. In Version II, although
banking frictions are present, banks have suﬃcient net worth during the boom regime (such that
their leverage constraints do not bind) which equals banks’ borrowing costs with the yields obtained
from the extension of credit. Finally, it is important to note that it would not be possible to observe
an expansion in investment and output if the model dynamics were generated with an anticipation
of higher future productivity, instead of an anticipation of higher asset values.31
When optimistic expectations are not met under Version I, investment in the non-traded sector
collapses, but traded sector investment first goes up and then declines gradually. There is a shift of
resources toward the traded sector. The economic downturn implies an aggravated increase in the
relative price of Home traded good, leading to a collapse in exports. Real exchange rate depreciates
to compensate and exports gradually come back to its steady state value. However, the shift in
resources toward traded sector is not enough to compensate for the overall fall of traded sector
output. The outcome from the Version II under the bust regime is significantly diﬀerent from the
no banking case (Version I). First, there is an amplification eﬀect that leads to a bigger collapse
in investment and output in both sectors. The amplification eﬀect is a result of the well known
financial accelerator mechanism that arises when bank leverage constraints bind. Collapse in bank
net worth implies a positive bank Lagrangian multiplier, leading to positive excess returns in each
sector. Banks want to extend credit but their abilities are constrained by their net worth, making
credit more expensive. Banks’ asset portfolios imply a larger balance sheet than that of in one-sector
models, implying a stronger accelerator eﬀect. Furthermore, the fall in tradable sector investment
and output is more pronounced in Version II. The reason is the spillover eﬀect that arise when
leverage constraints bind. Rewriting equation (28) in the bust regime is helpful in tracking the
mechanism:
QT,tST,t +
 NT
 T
QNT,tSNT,t =
⌫t
 T
Nt.
When the disappointment is bigger in the non-traded sector, banks deleverage their non-traded
sector assets in a greater fashion. The collapse in non-traded sector asset prices leads to a fall in
bank net worth, and then to a further collapse in traded sector asset prices. Intra-national spillover
eﬀect arises. The above equation also suggests that the spillover across sectors through bank balance
31Jaimovich and Rebelo (2009) preferences generate the plausible co-movement under news about future produc-
tivity.
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 sheets depends on the ratio of moral hazard parameters that apply to assets in each sector:  NT T .
The greater the ratio of divertability of non-traded sector assets to divertability of traded sector
assets, the stronger is the intra-national spillover eﬀect. However, consumption of imports and
exports still behaves at odds with the data because of the balanced trade condition.
Figure 9 exhibits the dynamics when there is international financial integration and compares
those with the dynamics from Version II. Purple line indicates the outcome from the former. In the
boom regime, when agents are hit by the news of higher future value of assets, Home banks expand
their balance sheets and increase their borrowings from households in both countries. Expansion in
the liabilities translates into an expansion of credit toward tradable and non-tradable non-financial
sectors. The proportion of overall lending to non-traded sector is bigger because of the higher
expected valuations vis-à-vis to those in traded sector. Expansion in Home economy decreases
domestic price levels and a persistent appreciation in real exchange rate contributes to a long-
lasting current account deficit. Wages in home economy arises more than their counterparts in
Foreign, implying higher unit labor costs in Home. As seen in the data (Figure 3), model suggests
that the overall increase in the unit labor costs is more pronounced in the non-traded sector until
the crisis occurs. Higher income translates into a higher consumption demand for imports, and
underlining the main cause of the persistent current account deficit (instead of a huge deterioration
in exports).
The disappointment in expectations causes a sudden reversal of capital flows, depressing Home
banks’ balance sheets. Bank credit to traded and non-traded non-financials collapses in a more
pronounced manner as the borrowing costs jump higher in this case. International spillover channel
arises. The bust regime in the baseline model is associated with larger fluctuations in all variables
than those in other model versions. Sudden reversals of capital flows imply a tighter leverage
constraint and the amplification mechanism is stronger in this case. A stronger drop in non-traded
sector bank assets contribute to a stronger intra-national spillover channel, indicating a bigger drop
in traded sector bank assets. Investment in both sectors collapse and Home economy experiences a
persistent recession. Collapse in relative wages lead to a stronger wealth eﬀect, and is followed by
a collapse in imports (demand channel). Real exchange rate depreciates severely, and the current
account sharply corrects itself. Opening up the financial trade in international markets magnifies
the contributions of intra-national spillover channel.
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 3.3.4 Propagation of Fluctuations Across Sectors
To understand the propagation from non-traded to traded sectors, I further compare the baseline
model with the model dynamics that are driven by same amount of expected valuation in each sector
(14.5% expected valuation of assets in each sector). Figure 10 compares these two versions. When
agents are more optimistic about the valuation of non-traded sector assets, they shift resources
from traded to non-traded sectors. Banks decrease lending to tradable sector even though the
expected valuations of traded sector assets are the same in each case. However, when news become
unfulfilled, sudden capital reversals shrink bank balance sheets and banks cut lending to both
sectors. Stronger intra-national spillover channel in the baseline model contributes to a stronger fall
in tradable sector output, and the overall economy gets into a deeper recession. The model suggests
that if the proceedings of foreign borrowing is used toward lower return sectors, it becomes hard to
match current liabilities with future surpluses when adverse conditions arise. Current account deficit
becomes a problem. The model outcome is in line with the consensus narrative on the Eurozone
crisis (see Baldwin and Giavazzi, 2015).
4 Unconventional Central Bank Policies
In the presence of financial frictions described above, ineﬃcient spreads between the return
to capital in each sector and the risk-free rate arise when expectations turn out to be incorrect.
Fluctuations in these spreads aﬀect the cost of capital, and in turn, overall output in the economy. A
central bank, constrained by the zero-lower-bound, can intervene in markets by increasing demand
on non-financial private sector assets, or by supplying further funding to the banking sector to
overcome the restriction on the size of banks’ portfolio of assets over their internal equity.
For central bank intervention to make a diﬀerence, it has to ex-ante justify its relative advantage
in transferring resources with respect to no intervention case. If the central bank is subject to the
same degree of frictions that the banking sector is subject to, then the unconventional policy will be
neutral. However, if the central bank is privileged in raising funds for its policy applications, then
substitution of central bank intermediation in lieu of private intermediation will have an impact on
the ineﬃciencies present in the model. In the rest of this section, I assume that the central bank
always honors its debt and can raise funds by issuing interest-bearing short-term claims. The relative
25
                            27 / 60
 eﬃciency of the central bank in intermediation makes the unconventional policy non-neutral.32
The policies that I am studying here are diﬀerent than those in the recent literature by its
response to news-led bust cycles, by the choice of funding for intervention—resources for intervention
are raised from banks instead of from households—, and by its response to sector specific variables.
The assumption of the unconventional policy financed by interest-bearing reserves is in line with the
evidence obtained from the Eurosystem balance sheet. Figure 11 exhibits the increase in deposit
liabilities of the Eurosystem from Monetary and Financial Institutions (MFIs) after the start of the
ECB unconventional policies in early 2008, indicative for the resources of the ECB firepower.
As the domestic economy is the one that is primarily aﬀected by the adverse conditions, I further
assume that there is limitation for Home banks to raise funds from households to finance the global
central bank’s unconventional policy. This friction does not apply to banks abroad. In doing so, I
would like to capture the risks borne by Home country’s possibility of an exit from the Eurozone,
and Home banks’ ability to divert ECB assets in such occasion. It is a realistic case, as at the time
of this writing, the potential exit of Greece from the Eurozone is occupying headlines. It is also
important to note that the introduction of unconventional policies in this manner will contribute to
the asymmetries in banking across two countries in the model.
In what follows, I examine the policy applications in greater detail.
4.1 Asset Purchases
On November 21, 2014, ECB started its private asset purchase program as a mean of using its
powers as a lender of last resort. The relevant ECB announcement33 indicated that these policies
were mainly targeted toward acquiring non-traded sector assets.
Building motivation from this case, I assume that a global central bank has the option of
intermediating a fraction 'umpT,t of total domestic tradable, and a fraction '
ump
NT,t of non-tradable
sector funding needs. In particular, now the central bank can purchase SgT,t ⌘ 'umpT,t ST,t, or SgNT,t ⌘
'umpNT,tSNT,t, in fractions of total sectoral assets. The private assets intermediated by the financial
intermediaries are denoted with SpT,t ⌘ (1  'umpT,t )ST,t, and SpNT,t ⌘ (1  'umpNT,t)SNT,t, respectively.
Deviating from the previous literature, I specify the fractions of the assets intermediated by the
32The irrelevance result is closely related with the Ricardian equivalence proposition in Barro (1974), and its
extension to open market operations that is studied in Wallace (1981). Sargent and Wallace (1982) also provide an
example that will make the credit policy special within real-bills regime.
33See Decision ECB/2014/45, November 19, 2014.
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 central bank as autoregressive processes with an innovation that occurs at the same time of the
realization of incorrectness of the news on the value of capital, at t = 33. That is:
'ˆumpi,t = ⇢'umpi 'ˆ
ump
i,t 1 + u
ump
i,t , (35)
where uumpi,t has zero mean and standard deviation of  uumpi =  "U with i 2 {T,NT}.34 Capped
variables indicate the deviations from their non-stochastic steady-state.
To finance these purchases, central bank issues debt to banks at rate 1+ rg,t+1, and banks fund
this activity by issuing deposits to households at the risk-free rate. The rate rg,t+1 is the interest
that will be paid by central bank to the financial intermediary between periods t and t+ 1, and it
is known in period t. Central bank’s balance sheet takes the following form:
QT,tS
g
T,t +QNT,tS
g
NT,t = B
g
t + ⇠tB
⇤g
⇤,t.
In this setting, Bgt and B
⇤g
⇤,t can be thought of as interest bearing reserves of Home and Foreign
banks at the central bank’s account. In equilibrium, the global central bank raises equal amount of
resources from each country (i.e. Bgt = ⇠tB
⇤g
⇤,t), as the sizes of the countries are equal to each other.
Moreover, following the previous literature, I introduce ineﬃciency costs of ⌧T and ⌧NT per unit
of private loans intermediated in each sector. For the asset purchase program to produce welfare
gains, its disadvantage in making loans together with the additional frictions arisen in the financial
sector due to the central bank policy should be oﬀset by the central bank’s advantage in obtaining
funds.
Now, the financial intermediary balance sheets become
QT,tS
p
T,t(j) +QNT,tS
p
NT,t(j)| {z }
Private Assets
+ Bgt (j)| {z }
Interest-Bearing Claims
= Bt+1(j) +B
⇤
t+1(j)| {z }
Liabilities
+ Nt(j)| {z }
Bank Capital
, (36)
with the incentive constraint now also indicating the banks’ ability to divert central bank debt in
the case of default:
Vt(Nt(j))    TQT,tST,t(j) +  NTQNT,tSNT,t(j) +  ECBBgt (j), (37)
34I also choose ⇢'umpi to ensure that the central bank balance sheet is sterilized in 12 years.
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 where  ECB <  NT . Here, it is easier for depositors to monitor the performance of central bank
debt than the performance of private asset portfolios, and hence, the former is subject to a lower
degree of bank malfeasance. In particular, in the quantitative analysis of this section, w.l.o.g. I
assume  ECB ⌘  NT2 .
It is shown in the appendices that the rate 1+rg,t+1 should also be set according to the following
equation:35
Et ⇤t,t+1⌦t+1(rk,NT,t+1   rt+1) =  NT ECBEt ⇤t,t+1⌦t+1(rg,t+1   rt+1). (38)
As limits to arbitrage is weaker for central bank debt, the ineﬃcient spread on central bank debt
is a fraction,  ECB NT , of the ineﬃcient spread on non-traded assets. After these modifications, the
restriction on the bank portfolio also depends on the magnitude of the central bank intervention.
Combination of the above identities leads to the following relationship between the total value of
intermediated private securities and bank net worth:
(1  'umpT,t )QT,tST,t +
 NT
 T
(1  'umpNT,t)QNT,tSNT,t +
 ECB
 T
Bgt 
⌫t
 T
Nt. (39)
In this case, the Langrangian multiplier associated with the bankers’ program can be expressed
as follows:
µt = max
(
1 
 
 Et [⇤t,t+1⌦t+1(1 + rt+1)Nt]
 TQT,tS
p
T,t +  NTQNT,tS
p
NT,t +  ECBB
g
t
!
, 0
)
(40)
If the constraint is not binding, there does not exist any ineﬃcient spread, and the unconventional
monetary policy is neutral. With the ineﬃciency costs and the additional frictions in the banking
sector present, the unconventional monetary policy will be welfare reducing in this case. However, if
the constraint is binding, neutrality of the policy disappears and the central bank intervention leads
to an overall increase in asset demand depending on the magnitude of the intervention. Equation
(40) states that the central bank intervention will loosen the binding constraints if the decrease in the
proportion of privately intermediate assets oﬀsets the additional friction borne from the divertibility
of interest bearing claims. The acquisition of non-traded assets will free up bank capital by a factor
of  NT T vis-à-vis acquisition of traded sector assets.
35A detailed solution of banks’ problem when there is unconventional policy can be found in Appendix C.
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 The evolution of aggregate bank net worth also takes the following form:
Nt = (  + ")
h
(ZT,t + (1   )QT,t) e T,tSpT,t 1 + (ZNT,t + (1   )QNT,t) e NT,tSpNT,t 1 + (1 + rg,t)Bgt 1
i
   [(1 + rt) (Bt +B⇤t )] .
(41)
Finally, it should be noted that the possible profits obtained by central bank intervention are
distributed back to households in Home and Foreign, in equal amounts, implying Tt = ⇠tT ⇤t in
equilibrium. Balanced budget of the central bank implies:
(rk,T,t   rg,t)QT,t 1ST,t 1'umpT,t 1 + (rk,NT,t   rg,t)QNT,t 1SNT,t 1'umpNT,t 1 = ⌥t 1 + Tt + ⇠tT ⇤t ,
where ⌥t 1 = ⌧T'umpT,t 1QT,t 1ST,t 1 + ⌧NT'
ump
NT,t 1QNT,t 1SNT,t 1, is the expression for total inef-
ficiency costs per unit of intermediation (e.g. central bank monitoring costs). Transfers of central
bank profits to domestic and abroad households do not have a direct eﬀect on net foreign asset
position, as they cancel out each other in the equilibrium. However, the unconventional monetary
policy will aﬀect the net foreign position through the deposit market clearing condition in Home.36
4.2 Liquidity Facilities
An alternative unconventional policy that is more reminiscent of the LTROs37 of the ECB is liquidity
facilities conducted by the common central bank in the model. Under this policy alternative, the
central bank lends funds to financial intermediaries, which in turn will lend to non-financial private
firms.
In this case, it is important for the central bank to distinguish illiquid banks from the insolvent
ones, as otherwise can lead to excessive forbearance and debt hangover as highlighted in Bagehot
(1873), and more recently in Gertler and Kiyotaki (2010). To overcome this issue, the central
bank provides liquidity facilities at a penalty rate and against eligible collateral to discourage the
ineﬃcient use of central bank funding.
I assume that the central bank provides non-contingent loans, Mt+1, to banks, at a rate, 1 +
36A detailed derivation is available in Appendix E.
37To address the illiquidity issues in the financial sector of the Eurozone, the first supplementary longer-term
refinancing operation (LTRO) of ECB with a six-month maturity was announced in March 2008. Between April 2008
and October 2011, the ECB conducted twenty LTROs with six-month maturity. Details of the ECB’s announcements
can be found in their website: https://www.ecb.europa.eu/mopo/implement/omo/html/index.en.html
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 rm,t+1, which is known in period t. Financial intermediary balance sheets take the following form
QT,tST,t(j) +QNT,tSNT,t(j) +B
g
t (j) = Bt+1(j) +B
⇤
t+1(j) + Mt+1(j)| {z }
Discount Window Lending
+Nt(j). (42)
The financial intermediary’s non-tradable sector firm assets and interest bearing reserves are
eligible collateral for the central bank liquidity facilities. Hence, for any unit of discount window
lending, a borrowing bank cannot divert any of those assets:
Vt(Nt(j))    TQT,tST,t(j) +  NT (QNT,tSNT,t(j) Mt+1) +  ECB(Bgt (j) Mt+1(j)). (43)
The cost of central bank funding is related to the excess returns on non-traded sector firm assets
as below
 Et [⇤t,t+1⌦t+1(rk,NT,t+1   rt+1)] =  NT ECB +  NT  Et [⇤t,t+1⌦t+1(rm,t+1   rt+1)] . (44)
After the appropriate aggregation in the banking sector, it can be shown that banks’ assets are
now proportional to their net worth and the amount of central bank liquidity in the financial sector
QT,tST,t +
 NT
 T
QNT,tSNT,t +
 ECB
 T
Bgt 
⌫t
 T t
Nt +
 ECB +  NT
 T
Mt+1, (45)
while the Langrangian multiplier associated with the bankers’ program is:
µt = max
⇢
1 
✓
 Et [⇤t,t+1⌦t+1(1 + rt+1)Nt]
 TQT,tST,t +  NTQNT,tSNT,t +  ECBB
g
t   ( ECB +  NT )Mt+1
◆
, 0
 
. (46)
Liquidity facilities will loosen the binding constraints, depending on whether the relaxation from
the borrowing against eligible collateral oﬀsets the additional friction borne from the divertibility
of interest bearing claims.
The evolution of aggregate bank net worth can also be expressed as follows:
Nt = (  + ")
⇥
(ZT,t + (1   )QT,t) e T,tST,t 1 + (ZNT,t + (1   )QNT,t) e NT,tSNT,t 1 + (1 + rg,t)Bgt 1
⇤
   [(1 + rt) (Bt +B⇤t ) + (1 + rm,t)Mt] .
(47)
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 Finally, the magnitude of liquidity facilities are determined by a similar rule as in the case of
private asset purchases, yielding to the following relationship:
Mt+1 = '
ump
T,t QT,tST,t + '
ump
NT,tQNT,tSNT,t, (48)
where 'umpT,t and'
ump
NT,t are given by (35).
Under liquidity facilities, the central bank budget constraint is modified as follows:
(rm,t   rg,t)QT,t 1ST,t 1'umpT,t 1 + (rm,t   rg,t)QNT,t 1SNT,t 1'umpNT,t 1 = ⌥t 1 + Tt + ⇠tT ⇤t .
There is no modification in Foreign banking sector conditions as none of the policy related
frictions are applicable to the banks abroad.
4.3 Experiments under Unconventional Central Bank Policies
When running simulations, I set 'umpT,t = 0 and  = 15. Hence, I investigate the policy’s contribution
to model performance when it is conducted in response to non-traded sector variables.
Figures 12 and 13 exhibit the model’s performance with respect to the Spanish data, when the
combination of central bank asset purchase program and liquidity facilities is in place. As discussed
in section 3.3.2, including policy in the model improves the model’s post-crisis performance. The
collapse in bank credit toward non-tradable sectors is less pronounced due to the central bank’s
asset purchasing program. The policy helps leverage constraints to relax, and banks start to allocate
more capital toward tradable sector firms, as returns from there are higher.38 Global central bank
is channeling funds from Foreign to Home when conducting policy, and private outflow of capital
is replaced by public inflow of capital, yielding a softer correction in the current account. This is
exactly the case observed in the Eurozone, and documented by Hale (2013) and Merler and Pisani-
Ferry (2012). Figure 13 shows that the correction in the non-traded share of the economy is slower
as the central bank is using its fire power to compensate for the loss in that sector.
Figure 14 compares the model dynamics under unconventional monetary policy (asset purchases)
38However, the model exaggerates the post-crisis increase in lending to the traded sector in the presence of un-
conventional policies vis-à-vis what is observed in the data, indicating the possibility of frictions between firms and
banks.
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 with the baseline model. Relaxation in the restriction on the size of bank portfolio over bank net
worth is relaxed, and the financial accelerator eﬀect is partially oﬀset by the policy. Hence, the
fall in investment and output in the non-traded sector is smaller when central bank action is in
place. Through the spillover channel discussed in Section 3, traded sector asset deleveraging is less
pronounced, causing the investment in the traded sector fall less than in the baseline model. The
unconventional policy studied above is more successful at preventing the spillover of the crisis to the
traded-sector than preventing the fall in output in the non-traded sector, where crisis is originated.
The reason is that returns are higher in the traded sector, and banks allocate funds to the high
return sectors after the realization of fundamentals. Figure 14 also shows that the proceedings of
public flows that replaced private flows across countries contributes to expansion of imports.
Finally, Figure 15 compares the dynamics under central bank asset purchases with liquidity
facilities. The figure shows that liquidity facilities are better at ameliorating the economy when
equal amount of central bank fire-power is in place under both options. Ineﬃcients spreads in non-
traded and traded sector decline 12bps and 24bps more under liquidity facilities, and it contributes
to a further relaxation of leverage constraints. Financial intermediaries use the central bank funding
to compensate for the losses in traded sector assets, and it contributes to a softer decline in traded
sector variables. The reason why liquidity facilities are superior to non-traded sector asset purchases
is because intermediaries allocate lending optimally across sectors when they acquire central bank
funding, whereas the asset-purchase program is directed toward only one sector. To sum up, the
unconventional policies laid out in this paper are successful at ameliorating the adverse conditions
in Home economy.
5 Conclusions
This paper presented a two-country model of macroeconomic interdependence with banking
frictions in which positive news about future asset values that are eventually unmaterialized lead
to a boom-bust cycle. The credit channel plays a key role in transmission and propagation of
fluctuations within and across countries. Over-optimism on the future value of non-traded sector
assets can generate excessive investment in that sector although returns are relatively smaller. When
expectations turn to be wrong, a sudden reversal of capital flows makes bank balance sheets weaker,
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 and it becomes hard to match current liabilities with future surpluses. The current account deficit
becomes stringent. The results are relevant because the recent consensus narrative on the Eurozone
crisis (see Baldwin and Giavazzi, 2015) suggests a similar view: “Capital flows tended to feed non-
tradable sectors in the periphery of the Eurozone, and when the investors lost trust in deficit nations,
the eﬀects of a sudden-stop were amplified due to the predominance of bank financing.” This paper
contributes to this debate by providing a rigorous framework for this consensus view.
I also use the model to study the performance of several types of unconventional policies such
as those implemented by the ECB. Existence of heterogeneous types of assets in the model makes
it possible to design policy in response to sector-specific variables. Moreover, the funding of central
bank intermediation is obtained through issuing interest bearing reserves to banks in both regions,
in line with the evidence for the Eurozone. With these new ingredients, the model shows that
liquidity facilities directed toward the financial sector perform better at mitigating the downturn
than direct asset purchases from non-financials in the non-traded sector. These results contribute
to the recently growing debate on assessing unconventional policies.
An extension of the model that will capture additional features of the Eurozone crisis will be
to introduce government debt in bank balance sheets. In this case, suspicions about government
solvency can induce suspicions about the solvency of banks, which in turn will further weaken the
economy. This can be captured in the model by introducing an endogenous government default
risk that varies with the expectations on the future state of the economy. I leave this extension for
future work.
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 Tables
Table 1: Domestic credit outstanding at the end of the period - ratios to GDP
Germany France Italy Ireland Greece Spain Portugal
2000 106 72 71 100 42 87 110
2004 101 76 78 126 62 111 124
2008 95 95 95 202 85 171 151
Source: Giavazzi and Spaventa (2010).
40
                            42 / 60
 Table 2: Quantitative Model Summary
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 Table 2: Quantitative Model Summary (Continued)
 Et [⇤t,t+1⌦t+1(rk,NT,t+1   rt+1)] =  NTµt
Shadow marginal value of
net worth
⌦t ⌘ (1    +  ⌫t)
Marginal value of banks’
net worth
⌫t =
 Et[⇤t,t+1⌦t+1(1+rt+1)]
1 µt
Banks’ Lagrange multiplier µt = max
n
1 
⇣
 Et[⇤t,t+1⌦t+1(1+rt+1)Nt]
 TQT,tST,t+ NTQNT,tSNT,t
⌘
, 0
o
Aggregate net worth
Nt = (  + ") [(ZT,t + (1   )QT,t) e T,tST,t 1
+(ZNT,t + (1   )QNT,t) e NT,tSNT,t 1]    (1 + rt) (Bt +B⇤t )
Deposit market clearing QT,tST,t +QNT,tSNT,t = Bt+1 +B⇤t+1 +Nt
Net foreign asset position
 
⇠tB⇤,t+1  B⇤t+1
 
+ 12 [(Ct   ⇠tC⇤t )  (Nt   ⇠tN⇤t )]
= (⇠t (1 + r⇤t )B⇤,t   (1 + rt)B⇤t )
+ 12
⇣
wT,tLT,t + wNT,tLNT,t   ⇠t
⇣
w⇤T,tL
⇤
T,t + w
⇤
NT,tL
⇤
NT,t
⌘⌘
+ 12
⇥
 (1 + rt)(QT,t 1KT,t +QNT,t 1KNT,t  Nt 1)
⇤
  12 ⇠t
h
 ⇤(1 + r⇤t )(Q⇤T,t 1K
⇤
T,t +Q
⇤
NT,t 1K
⇤
NT,t  N⇤t 1)
i
  12 (1   )[QT,te T,tKT,t
+QNT,te
 NT,tKNT,t   ⇠t
⇣
Q⇤T,te
 ⇤T,tK⇤T,t +Q
⇤
NT,te
 ⇤NT,tK⇤NT,t
⌘
]
- 12
h
IT,t + INT,t   ⇠t(I⇤T,t + I⇤NT,t)
i
+ 12 (1      ")[
 
ZT,t + (1   )QT,t
 
e T,tKT,t
+
 
ZNT,t + (1   )QNT,t
 
e NT,tKNT,t]
  12 ⇠t(1   ⇤   ")[
⇣
Z⇤T,t + (1   )Q⇤T,t
⌘
e 
⇤
T,tK⇤T,t
+
 
Z⇤NT,t + (1   )Q⇤NT,t
 
e 
⇤
NT,tK⇤NT,t]
42
                            44 / 60
 Table 3: Parameter Values
Parameter Value Comments
Discount factor   0.995 Standard RBC value
Risk aversion coeﬃcient ⇢ 2 Standard RBC value
Relative weight of labor in the utility $ 5.584 Gertler and Kiyotaki
(2010)
Inverse Frisch elasticity (T sector) '1 0.276 Gertler and Karadi
(2011)
Inverse Frisch elasticity (NT sector) '2 0.276 Gertler and Karadi
(2011)
Deposit adjustment ⌘ 0.025 Standard RBC value
Inverse elasticity of substitution between Home
and Foreign goods
! 1.2 Standard RBC value
Inverse elasticity of substitution between
traded and non-traded goods
 1 Drozd and Nosal (2010)
Investment adjustment 'K 5 Bernanke, Gertler, and
Gilchrist (1999)
Depreciation   0.025 Standard RBC value
Home bias aH 0.55 To match data
properties
Share of tradable sector aT 0.55 To match data
properties
Share of capital in production ↵ 0.33 Standard RBC value
Exit probability of banks   0.975 Bank survival of 10
years
Fraction of start-up funds " 0.0001 To minimize the eﬀect
of banker entry-exit
Tradable sector asset diversion  T 0.4126 To match a
steady-state excess
return in NT sector of
50 bps, in T sector of
100bps, when home
leverage ratio is 4.
Non-tradable sector asset diversion  NT 0.2063
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 Figures
Figure 1: Change in Bank Lending (Levels)
Source: Bank of Spain and Bundesbank.
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 Figure 2: Shares of Sectors in Total Gross Value Added
Source: Eurostat
Notes: Non-tradable represents construction; wholesale and retail trade; transport, accommodation and food services.
Tradable represents industry except construction.
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 Figure 3: Changes in Sectoral Unit Labor Costs
Panel A: Spain
Panel B: Germany
Source: Darvas (2012).
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 Figure 4A: Eurozone exports (in percent of GDP)
Source: Eurostat
Figure 4B: Eurozone imports (in percent of GDP)
Source: Eurostat
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 Figure 5: Sensitivity of Bank Leverage
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 Figure 6: Model and Data (1)
Data source: Eurostat and Bank of Spain.
Note: Current account data indicate the percent deviations from 1995-2014 average. Current account
model variables are percent deviations from the steady state. Panel B indicates the change in levels. Straight
lines are paths of model variables whereas dotted lines belong to the data. Tradables (T) include industry
(excluding construction), agriculture, and fisheries. Non-tradables (NT) include construction and services.
49
                            51 / 60
 Figure 7: Model and Data (2)
Data source: Eurostat
Notes: Both panels show the changes in levels. Straight lines are paths of model variables whereas
dotted lines belong to the data. Non-tradables (NT) include construction, wholesale and retail trade, trans-
port, accommodation, food service and real estate activities. Tradables (T) include industry (excluding
construction), agriculture, forestry and fishing.
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 Figure 11: Composition of Eurosystem Liabilities (in billions of euros)
Source: ECB
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 Figure 12: Model and Data under Unconventional Policy (1)
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 Figure 13: Model and Data under Unconventional Policy (2)
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